OP-ED; THE STORY OF THE MEMOS

The Story of the Memos

Memoranda run through offices everyday. Whether they are for new policies concerning dental care, or they are to announce the hiring of a new employee, their ubiquity in the office is astounding. Memos have taken on a new significance in the hyper-secret world of the Bush administration, as they are the only real insight into the inner workings and dealings of the offices of this administration.

These memos from administration officials are the closest thing the press has to a leak, thus the flurry of attention. The content found inside these memos is worth looking at regardless, but the rarity makes it all the more important.

Two memos have recently examined the issue of Iraq head on. National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley wrote one dated Nov. 8 in which he expresses doubt in the legitimacy and power of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The memo states that Maliki, could be participating in some of the sectarian violence, wittingly or unwittingly.

There were reports, according to the memo, of undelivered services to Sunni areas, and an active campaign to “consolidate Shia power in Baghdad.” The memo speaks of good intentions and nice words for Washington, but not of pure action. In order for Maliki to be successful, Hadley makes a list of suggestions, including working with the Saudis to curtail Sunni insurgency and the creation of an American National Strike Force, a large group of advisers to work with the Iraqi police force.

The candid nature of the memo was astounding, especially since the President was about to meet with Maliki in Amman to discuss his future as Prime Minister. Maliki subsequently snubbed the President by uninviting him to a meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan, and Maliki testily met with the president afterwards. Maliki was the candidate endorsed by the Americans in the elections of the newest “unity” government, but the memo illustrated reluctance in continuing the support.

More candid was the memo from outgoing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He is known for his controversial memos, meant to spark debate by his deputies, including one he wrote in 2003 about Iraq possibly becoming a “long, hard slog,” as well as posing this question to his subordinates: are we creating more terrorists in Iraq than we are killing? Foreshadowing ex post facto (the invasion to now) really helped the US, now didn’t it?

His latest memo, dated Nov. 6 but leaked Sunday, calls for a “major adjustment” to Iraq policy. “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough,” he said. Throughout the war, Rumsfeld has been the most steadfast proponent of Bush’s “stay-the-course” strategy, but the memo signaled a significant change of heart.

Rumsfeld considers the redeployment of troops in the region, proposing the movement of troops from the most sensitive areas of Iraq, to Kuwait and surrounding nations, for the US to act as a rapid-deployment force, to aid the forming Iraqi army. Call this a Rumsfeldian spin on Congressman John Murtha’s policy.

The suggestions for new policy in Iraq found in Rumsfeld’s memo are divided into two sections: those that are feasible or “above the line,” and those that are considerably less so or “below the line.” “Below The Line” policies include a timetable for withdrawal, while “above the line” suggestions include a phased drawdown of troops.

The departing Secretary of Defense strikes a surprisingly parallel tone to that of the provisions of Bush’s No Child Left Behind Act, Bush’s education law, when he considers abandoning regions fractured by “bad behavior” and rewarding those with good. This is not working with the American education system, and it is just as likely to work in Iraq.

The memos reveal something extremely important: there is substantive debate going on throughout the administration on the extremely important issue of Iraq. The White House staff is not necessarily in lockstep with each other, and such exhaustive debate may lead to better policy, better governance and finally, an exit strategy.